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The rule, as I understand it. is that the Court of Appeal will 
not interfere with an order made by a Judge in the exercise 
of his discretion unless he has proceeded on some wrong prin­
ciple, which is not the case here.-'
It should be noted that this statement is quite different from the 
portion of the headnotc quoted above.
In King v. Paradis Chief Justice Michaud apparently exercised his 
discretion on the sole ground that several of tne witnesses were resi­
dent in New Brunswick and did not discuss the propriety of this exer­
cise 011 the motion to set aside the order because, he stated, it was not 
questioned.
J. W . McManus, III Law, U.N.B.
21. 119241 3 D .L.R . 103, at p. 104 (M an. C. A .i.
ASSAULT — AGREEMENT TO “FIGHT IT OUT”— 
RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES — EX TURPI CAUSA — 
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
The plaintiff and defendant, who had been drinking in a tavern, 
tiuarrcllcd and agreed to go outside and settle their differences with 
tlicir fists. The plaintiff, knocked down by a blow to the head, suffer­
ed a couple of broken teeth, cuts on his face and a fractured ankle. He 
claimcd damages for assault. The defendant denied the assault, alleging 
that the plaintiff was the assailant and that reasonable force only was 
used in self-protection. Held, for the defendant.W ade v. Martin. [1955] 
3 D .L.R. 635 (Nfld.).
This case was decided on two grounds, each embodied in a Latin 
maxim: (1) ex turpi causa non oritur actio; and (2) volenti non fit 
injuria. In regard to the former, the trial judge said the fight was a 
breach of the peace; that it was “indeed criminal”. Consent of the 
parties to participate in the fracas could not render it innocent because 
‘ ‘No person can license another to commit a crime’. . . Nor can anyone 
lawfully consent to bodily harm, save for some reasonable purpose: for 
example, a proper surgical operation or manly sports.”1
In T he Queen v. Coney, Mathew, J. said: “It was said, that be­
cause of the consent of the combatants to fight there could not be 
an assault, . . . The contention really meant that the agreement of the 
men to fight rendered the contest lawful and innocent. There is, how­
ever, abundant authority for saying that no consent can render that 
innocent which is in fact dangerous.”2 And in Rex v. Donovan, Swift,
1. Salm on d on T orts (11th. ed. 1953 ) 42.
2. (1881-2) 8 Q .B. 534, a t  pp. 546 and 547.
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J. said: “If an act is unlawful in the sense of being itself a criminal act, 
it is plain that it cannot be rendered lawful because the person to whose 
detriment it is done consents to it. No person can license another to 
commit a crime.”3
A plaintiff cannot recovcr compensation for harm received while 
he is voluntarily participating in a crime if the harm is caused by 
another acting jointly with him. However, “a plaintiff is not ‘disabled 
from recovering by reason of being himself a wrongdoer, unless some 
unlawful act or conduct 011 his own part is connected with the harm 
suffered by him as part of the same transaction.’ ”4 I11 Colburn v. Pat­
m ore, a newspaper proprietor failed in an action against his editor to 
recover compensation for damages he had to pay because of a libel 
printed in the paper. Lord Lyndhurst said: “I know of no case in which 
a person who has committed an act, declared by the law to be criminal, 
has been permitted to recover compensation against a person who has 
acted jointly with him in the commission of the crime.”5 Also in Bur­
rows v. R hodes,Kennedy, J. said: “It has, I think, long been settled law 
that if an act is manifestly unlawful, or the doer of it knows it to be 
unlawful, as constituting either a civil wrong or a criminal offence, he 
cannot maintain an action for contribution or for indemnity against 
the liability which results to him therefrom.”''' Similarly in Haseldine 
v. H osken, 1 the court agreed that if a plaintiff cannot maintain his cause
of action without showing, as part of such cause of action, that he 
has been guilty of illegality, the courts will not assist him.
Probably the most recent relevant Canadian decision before Wade 
v. Martin is the Ontario case, Danluk v. Birkner . 8 The plaintiff was 
on the second floor of a building operated as a betting establishment 
when a buzzer announced a raid by the police. The plaintiff ran to 
a door, opened it and stepped out. There being 110 platform or stairs 
he fell to the ground and was injured. The trial judge gave judgment 
for the plaintiff on the ground that, as an invitee, the defendants owed 
him a duty which they had not discharged. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal9 allowed an appeal on two grounds: (1) the plaintiff did not 
have the status of an invitee, and, even if he did, the defendant’s in­
vitation did not extend to the act complained of; and (2) the plaintiff 
was forbidden by criminal law to enter the premises and should not 
be compensated for injuries which resulted from his own criminal 
misconduct. The Supreme Court of Canada10 upheld the decision of 
the Court of Appeal, but on the sole ground that, even as an invitor, 
the defendant’s duty did not extend to the manner in which the plain­
tiff made his exit.
3. [1934 ] 2 K .B  498, a t p. 507 (C .C .A .).
4. Salm on d  on T o rts  (11th. ed. 1953> 42.
5. 1 C M. & R . 72, a t p. 83; 149 E .R . 999, a t p. 1003.
6. [18991 1 Q .B . 816, a t p. 828.
7. [19331 1 K .B . 822 (C .A .).
8. [19451 O.W .N . 822.
9. [1946! O .R . 427; [1946 ] 3 D .L .R . 172.
10. [1947] S .C .R . 484; [1947 ] 3 D .L .R . 337.
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T he Supreme Court did not pass on the second ground of 
decision in tne Ontario appeal. There is, however, much to be said 
for the view of Roach, J.A. tnat the plaintiff did not have the status of an 
invitee. The courts ought not to recognize a request or invitation to 
a person to do an act in violation of the Criminal Code.11 Nor should the 
plaintiff have been considered a licensee, for a licensee is one who 
is permitted to go on the premises, and permission means that he has 
the consent of tne occupier who cannot in law “consent” to a crime.
The basic notion in the instant case and in the Ontario Court 
of Appeal decision in the Danluk case appear the same: to bar recovery 
for injuries suffered by one’s participation in an unlawful act. The reas­
on is that it would be against public policy to permit a person to bene­
fit from his own crimc.
The second ground for deciding for the defendant in the Wade 
ease was that the plaintiff had consented to the assault. The trial judge 
said that, even if the fight were not criminal, consent would on tne 
facts be a bar to recoverv. If it were a crime, however, the defence 
of consent would pose the problem whether the plaintiff could consent 
to a criminal act. “It has never been decided whether consent in such 
cases is a good defencc in a civil action, but it is submitted that on 
principle it ought to be.”12 At first sight some of the early English 
cases seem to be authorities for the proposition that consent would not 
be a defence: “. . . but licence to beat me is void, because ’tis against 
the peace.”13 It was also said that “the fighting being unlawful, the 
consent to fight, if proved would not be a bar to tne plaintiff's action.”14 
Trespass was introduced to bring within the jurisdiction of the King’s 
courts offences which, falling short of felonies, seriously threatened tne 
peace of the realm. Not onTv was the writ used to give a remedv for 
trespasses actually committed with force and arms against the king’s 
peace, but, under the writ, the King’s courts took jurisdiction, con­
currently with the local courts, over invasions of personal and property 
rights directly resulting from acts which had no element of violence and 
did not amount to breaches of the peace. So long as the writ of trespass 
was the only machinery by which breaches of the King’s peace could 
be punished, the consent of a private party could not defeat an action. 
But since setting up separate machinery for punishing breaches of the 
peace not amounting to felonies late in the seventeenth century, the 
Crown had no interest in the trespass action. Thus the rationale of 
these early cases no longer applies to trespass actions. . . it is a 
manifest contradiction in terms to say that the defendant assaulted 
the plaintiff by his permission.”15
11. B u t see the editorial notes in (19461 3 D .L.R . 172, a t p. 173 and [1947] 3 D .L.R . 337.
12. Salm ond on T orts 111th. ed. 19531 42.
13. M atthew  v. O llerton, C om berbach 218; 90 E .R . 438.
14. B oulter v. C lark . (1747) Bull N .K  16
15. C hriitop herson  v. B are . (lM 3i 11 Q .B. 473, at p. 477; 116 E .R . 554, at p. 556.
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The two maxims quoted both were obstacles to recovery in Wade 
v. Martin. However, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria” might con­
ceivably, though it is submitted improperly, be circumvented by the 
argument that the courts, even in a civil action, will not recognize con­
sent to an unlawful act, and thereby leave the defendant in the same 
position as if there had not been consent. Nevertheless “ex turpi causa 
non oritur actio” stands firmly in the path of recovery. For, even 
though consent were not recognized, the action would arise out of 
the plaintiff’s own unlawful act.
A Canadian case, Bradley v. C olem an .Ui is of interest because it 
contains dictum on the scarcitv of authority on the present problem. 
It also refers to the conflict of United States authorities, but says that 
the rule prevailing in the majority of the states in 1922 was: “ ‘W here 
the parties engage in mutual combat in anger, each is civilly liable to the 
other for any physical injury inflicted by him during the fight. The 
fact that the parties voluntarily engaged in the combat is no defence to 
an action by either of them to recover damages for personal injuries 
inflicted upon him by the other.’ ”17 The conflict of American authority 
appears in the following comparison:
Corpus Juris states: “By the weight of authority consent will not 
avail as a defense in a case of mutual combat, as such fighting is un­
lawful; and hence the acceptance of a challenge to fight, ana volun­
tarily engaging in a fight by one party with another, because of the 
challenge, cannot be set up as a defense in a civil suit for damages for 
an assault and battery, although it seems that such consent may be 
shown in mitigation of damages.”18
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, on the other hand, states 
this rule in s. 60: “Except as stated in s. 61, an assent which satisfies 
the rules stated in ss. 50 to 59 prevents an invitation from being tortious 
and, therefore, actionable, although the invasion assented to constitutes 
a crime.”
Daniel M. Hurley, I Law, U.N.B.
16. (19251 28 O .W .N . 261.
17. Ib id ., a t p. 262.
18. 5 C .J . ,  a t p. 630.
